Single service comparison

Cloud KMS models keys as regional resources under a project, organized by key-ring and key-version objects; IAM policies attach to rings and keys for fine-grained access. Huawei DEW-KMS places customer master keys at the region/account level without an explicit ring abstraction, and access is governed through Huawei Cloud IAM policies plus key grants, so the trust boundary and policy scoping differ. Customers must remap key-ring hierarchies and IAM bindings to DEW's CMK-plus-IAM model and accept fewer ring-level isolation points.

GCP separates KMS, Secret Manager, and CloudHSM into distinct services; DEW consolidates Key Management Service (KMS), Cloud Secret Management Service (CSMS), Key Pair Service (KPS), and Dedicated HSM (DHSM) under one product. DHSM offers single-tenant HSM instances with PKCS#11/JCE/CNG interfaces (FIPS 140-2 Level 3), whereas GCP CloudHSM shares HSM capacity within KMS. Match Cloud KMS default operations to DEW-KMS, secret storage to CSMS, and any dedicated HSM requirement to DHSM rather than assuming one shared equivalent.

Integration and operational responsibility differ. Cloud KMS integrates natively with GCP services via CMEK and provides audit through Cloud Audit Logs; DEW-KMS integrates with OBS, EVS, IMS, and RDS for encryption and logs through Cloud Trace Service. Quotas, rotation, key import/external-key (EKM) support, and BYOK mechanics are not equivalent: validate DEW's supported algorithms, key-version limits, rotation schedules, and import mechanisms per region, because parity varies and automatic rotation policy semantics are not identical.

Inventory Cloud KMS key-rings, key versions, algorithms, IAM bindings, CMEK links, and applications calling the KMS API. Map each GCP construct to the appropriate DEW subservice: encryption keys to DEW-KMS, secrets/credentials to CSMS, SSH key pairs to KPS, and single-tenant HSM or PKCS#11 workloads to DHSM. Confirm regional availability, supported algorithms, key-version limits, and IAM permission equivalents before committing a target design.

Re-key or re-wrap data rather than assuming raw key export. Cloud KMS key material cannot generally be exported, so migrate by creating new CMKs in DEW-KMS with the same algorithm and rotation intent, then re-encrypt existing data or re-wrap envelope data encryption keys against the new CMKs. Update application code from the GCP KMS gRPC/REST API to the DEW API, reissue IAM policies, and reconfigure CMEK references on OBS/EVS/RDS resources to the DEW CMKs.

Validate cryptographic equivalence and operability. Run parallel encrypt/decrypt/sign/verify tests against representative payloads, confirm rotation schedules, IAM enforcement, and Cloud Trace Service logging match your prior Cloud Audit Logs coverage, and verify emergency key disable/destroy behavior. Execute a controlled cutover only after application configuration, CI/CD secrets, and storage-service CMK references are updated and back-verified.

Account for cost and governance gaps. GCP typically bills per key version and per cryptographic request; DEW-KMS bills by KMS instance edition, key count, and API requests while DHSM is priced per dedicated instance, so recompute TCO using peak operation volume, key count, retention, and cross-region traffic. Recreate key-state policies, rotation automation, and secret rotation workflows inside DEW/CSMS, because GCP-managed rotation and Secret Manager integrations do not transfer automatically.